Questions for debate

What is ‘radicalisation’ or ‘extremism’? Is it unique to Islam? Is it always religious? Is it a new and unique phenomenon, or just a new label for certain forms of terrorist violence? And what can research tell us about its causes and how to prevent it?

Conclusions from the debate

As currently used ‘radicalisation’ often includes too much and too little. Too little, because it focuses attention only on Islamic or religious forms of terrorism, and too much because radical ideas and ‘Islamism’ do not usually lead to violence and are too widespread for security initiatives to counter (attempts may be counter-productive.)

As for what causes recent incidences of extremist violence, there is a growing consensus that there are multiple causes including: a sense of grievance and isolation, belief that violence can remedy a perceived problem, and contact with networks and images that glorify the use of violence.

Research Findings

‘Radicalisation’ is a new word, but the process whereby groups and individuals with religious or secular commitments turn violent is not new, and past and present research, e.g. that on New Religious Movements and various forms of terrorism, should not be ignored.

What needs to be explained (and countered) is not the embrace of radical ideas, which is widespread and always has been (e.g. communism), but why some groups and individuals embrace violence, which is rare.

It is impossible and often counter-productive for states and their security forces to counter radical ideas. This does not mean that extremist beliefs do not need to be contested, but there are more effective ways to do this – e.g. good education, including in religion and theology, and active initiatives in civil society.

Violence is always over-determined – there are multiple causes, many paths, and no single ‘conveyor belt’ to violence. There are situational, strategic, social and individual causes. This means that the move to violence can be explained in retrospect, but not accurately predicted in advance (two people with exactly the same circumstances may act violently in one case and not in another).

One dynamic observed in some of the research is the existence of an ‘us-and them’ (minority/majority) mentality combined with a sense of grievance. If the ‘minority’ then starts to attract criticism and repression by agents of ‘the majority’ this can lead to a vicious cycle of escalation.

The importance of (individual) belief as a driver of action tends to be overestimated. Involvement in social networks is arguably more important. Also important and underestimated is access to images, aesthetics, cultures and practices of violence which are not exclusively Islamicist but can be harnessed to Islamist ideas – as well as to anti-Muslim ideas.

There is no evidence to support the reality of ‘brainwashing’, nor of de-programming or de-radicalisation where these are equated with quick processes which bypass normal modes of socialisation, cognition and volition.

Points of Debate and Disagreement

Counter-radicalisation policies like Prevent I cast the net too wide, and have caused more problems than they have solved. Islamist beliefs do not themselves lead to violence and it is counter-productive to ‘target’ and try to change them.		Islamist belief is itself dangerous, a necessary step on the pathway to violence, and should be countered.
It is the move to violence which is the problem and should be the focus of security concern.		It is Islamism which is the earlier identifiable problem and a proper focus of security concern.
There are many pathways to violence, and the element of choice always remains, making it impossible to predict which individuals will act violently.		Pathways to violence can be modelled and resort to violence predicted.
Either religion is the major factor in radicalisation or, politics is the major factor in radicalisation.		It is often impossible to separate the religious and the political.

Practical Suggestions

‘Radicalisation’ includes too much. The holding of radical, intolerant attitudes, is widespread in all societies. It is the move to violence which needs to be understood and countered.

Counter-radicalisation policies have spread the net too wide. This is both ineffective and can be counter-productive when it engenders an us/them mentality and sense of grievance in a ‘target’ community.

Counter-radicalisation should follow established counter-terrorism pathways, which rely on gathering good intelligence and looking in a focused way for indications of interest in violence, involvement in networks advocating such violence, and other indicators of a move to violent action.

It is not the business of the state to prescribe or proscribe particular theologies, any more than particular political ideologies – so long as they operate within the law. It is, however, legitimate to educate and argue against false beliefs.

The model of human behaviour which holds that beliefs are the ‘drivers’ of action is mis-leading; practices, emotions and relationships are just as important as beliefs.

How the Media Reported the Debate

Wednesday 07 March 2012, held at 61 Whitehall

What have we learned since 9/11 and 7/7 about the causes, parallels and precedents of violent extremism, and the effectiveness of policies designed to tackle the problem? Watch & listen to the event below. The debate was chaired by Charles Clarke and Linda Woodhead. Read the press release & access media coverage here.